Xiaolong Wang

Previous classes

Discriminative models for image recognition

Discriminative models for video understanding


This Class


- Generative Adversarial Networks, DCGAN
- Progressive GAN, StyleGAN
- Evaluating GANs
- Adversarial Examples

Slides partially from: http://cs231n.stanford.edu/ https://slazebni.cs.illinois.edu/fall20/



Noise Z





Goodfellow et al. 2014









Radford et al. 2016.

Brock et al. 2019




Karras et al. 2019

GANS

Generator: Takes noise vector as inputs and outputs the image.

Discriminator: Classify the images as real or fake.

Learning to sample



Training data $x \sim p_{data}$


We want to learn p_{model} that matches p_{data}



Generated samples $x \sim p_{model}$









Noise Vector

Goodfellow et al., 2014










Noise Vector

Training Discriminator: Minimize the binary classification loss.







Noise Vector

Training Generator: Maximize the binary classification loss.

GAN objective

- The discriminator D(x) should output the probability that the sample x is real
 - That is, we want D(x) to be close to 1 for real data and close to 0 for fake
- Expected conditional log likelihood for real and generated data: \bullet

•
$$\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\text{data}}} \log D(x) + \mathbb{E}_{x \sim x}$$

•
$$= \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\text{data}}} \log D(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim x}$$

- $p_{\text{gen}} \log(1 D(x))$
- $p_{v}\log(1 D(G(z)))$
- We seed the generator with noise zdrawn from a simple distribution p(Gaussian or uniform)

GAN objective

 $V(G,D) = \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p} \log(1 - D(G(z)))$

The discriminator wants to correctly distinguish real and fake samples:

- The generator wants to fool the discriminator: • $G^* = \arg \min_G V(G, D)$
- Train the generator and discriminator jointly in a minimax game \bullet

 $D^* = \arg \max_D V(G, D)$

Original GAN results

MNIST digits



Nearest real image for sample to the left

Toronto Face Dataset



- Goodfellow et al., 2014


Original GAN results

CIFAR-10 (FC networks)




Goodfellow et al., 2014

CIFAR-10 (conv networks)



DCGANs



Radford et al., 2016.

DCGANs


- Early, influential convolutional architecture for generator \bullet
- **Discriminator architecture:**
 - Don't use pooling, only strided convolutions
 - Use Leaky ReLU activations (sparse gradients cause problems for training)
 - Use only one FC layer before the softmax output Use batch normalization after most layers (in the generator also)


Radford et al., 2016.

Generated bedrooms after one epoch



Generated bedrooms after five epochs






 $\alpha z_0 + (1 - \alpha) z_1$ Z_1



Vector arithmetic in the z space







neutral man










smiling man

Vector arithmetic in the z space



with glasses

without glasses

without glasses

woman with glasses

Pose transformation by adding a "turn" vector







BigGAN, Progressive GAN, StyleGAN

BigGANs




Brock et al. Large Scale GAN Training for High Fidelity Natural Image Synthesis. 2019.


BigGANs

- Large Batch Size: 2048 Images
- Class Conditional Batch Normalization
- Non-local Operator

Conditional Batch Normalization




Non-local Operator



Zhang et al. Self-Attention Generative Adversarial Networks. 2019. Wang et al. Non-local Neural Networks. CVPR 2018.

BigGANs Interpolation




Progressive GANs




T. Karras, T. Aila, S. Laine, J. Lehtinen. Progressive Growing of GANs for Improved Quality, Stability, and Variation. ICLR 2018

Progressive GANs

 \bullet corresponding to higher-resolution outputs



Key idea: train lower-resolution models, gradually add layers



Training time: 0 days 4x4 resolution

Generator

z = random code


x = real image

Discriminator

x' = generated image

Progressive GANs

Key idea: train lower-resolution models, gradually add layers \bullet corresponding to higher-resolution outputs



Progressive GANs: Results

256 x 256 results for LSUN categories



POTTEDPLANT

HORSE

SOFA


BUS

CHURCHOUTDOOR

BICYCLE

TVMONITOR

StyleGANs



Karras et al. A Style-Based Generator Architecture for Generative Adversarial Networks. 2019.

Before: Conditional BN

$$CBN(x_i, c) = w_{s,c} \frac{x_i - E_B(x_i)}{\sqrt{Var_B(x_i)}} + w_{b,c}$$


Here: Adaptive Instance Normalization (AdaIN)

$$Adaln(x_i, w) = w_{s,i} \frac{x_i - \mu(x_i)}{\sigma(x_i)} + w_{b,i}$$

StyleGANs




Mixing styles



"Two sets of images were generated from their respective latent codes (sources A and B); the rest of the images were generated by copying a specified subset of styles from source B and taking the rest from source A."

Mixing styles



Mixing styles



StyleGAN: Bedrooms



StyleGAN: Cars



Evaluating GANs

How to evaluate GANs?


- Showing pictures of samples is not enough, especially for • simpler datasets like MNIST, CIFAR, faces, bedrooms, etc.
- We cannot directly compute the likelihoods of high-dimensional samples (real or generated), or compare their distributions
- is hard to evaluate

Many GAN approaches claim mainly to improve stability, which

GAN evaluation: Human studies

• Example: Turing test

Instructions




We present you pictures that are either computer generated or are real photographs. Your task is to choose which one are which.

Images contain pictures of airplanes, automobiles, birds, cats, deer, dogs, frogs, horses, ships, and trucks. If you cannot clearly recognize what's the class of the object, then it's likely to be a generated image.

SET CHECKBOX ON IMAGES THAT LOOK LIKE GENERATED BY A COMPUTER.



Submit



GAN evaluation: Inception score (IS)

- Key idea: generators should produce images with a variety of recognizable object classes
- Defined as $IS(G) = \exp[\mathbb{E}_{x \sim G} KL(P(y|x) || P(y))]$ where P(y|x)is the posterior label distribution returned by an image classifier (e.g., InceptionNet) for sample x
 - If x contains a recognizable object, entropy of P(y|x) should be low If generator generates images of diverse objects, the marginal distribution P(y) should have high entropy
 - lacksquare

T. Salimans, I. Goodfellow, W. Zaremba, V. Cheung, A. Radford, X. Chen, Improved techniques for training GANs, NIPS 2016

GAN evaluation: Inception score (IS)

- Disadvantages lacksquare
 - single image per class (mode dropping) could still score well
 - Is sensitive to network weights, not necessarily valid for generative \bullet models not trained on ImageNet, can be gamed (Barratt & Sharma 2018)



A GAN that simply memorizes the training data (overfitting) or outputs a

Adversarial Examples


Adversarial examples

 \bullet input image so it is misclassified

African elephant



koala



schooner



iPod




We can "fool" a neural network by imperceptibly perturbing an

Difference




10x Difference




Difference



10x Difference




Finding the smallest adversarial perturbation



Input

Perturbation x 10

Szegedy, et al., 2014




Generating adversarial examples

correct class y^* , take element-wise sign, update in resulting direction:



 $+.007 \times$



Goodfellow et al., 2015

"panda" 57.7% confidence

 \boldsymbol{x}

Fast gradient sign method: Find the gradient of the loss w.r.t.

 $x \leftarrow x + \epsilon \operatorname{sgn}\left(\frac{\partial L(x, y^{*})}{\partial x}\right)$

 $sign(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, y))$

"nematode" 8.2% confidence



x + $\epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, y))$ "gibbon" 99.3 % confidence

Defending against adversarial examples




Figure 2. More examples similar to Figure 1. We show feature maps corresponding to clean images (top) and to their adversarial perturbed versions (bottom). The feature maps for each pair of examples are from the same channel of a res₃ block in the same ResNet-50 trained on clean images. The attacker has a maximum perturbation $\epsilon = 16$ in the pixel domain.

C. Xie et al., <u>Feature Denoising for Improving Adversarial Robustness</u>, CVPR 2018

Defending against adversarial examples

- Training with adversarial examples improves the network robustness against adversarial examples
- It does not improve the performance on natural images

Summary

- Generative Adversarial Networks, DCGAN
- Progressive GAN, StyleGAN
- Evaluating GANs
- Adversarial Examples